Who cares about care? The potential of an emerging human right and possible objections

*Visiting Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University

1. Introduction

Philosopher Alasdair McIntyre famously wrote about the importance of living within networks of “uncalculated giving and graceful receiving.”[1] The inherent fragility of the human body—particularly at the beginning and end of life—creates a shared vulnerability and dependence, underscoring the fundamental role of providing and receiving care. In McIntyre’s words, “[I]t is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing, as we encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition, mental defect and disturbance, and human aggression and neglect.”[2] Beyond meeting biological needs, the development of language, cognitive abilities, and core capacities—including love, play, reason, creativity, and autonomy—depends on the presence and care of others.[3] Discussions on care thus must center on the concept of interpersonal networks, demanding “a balance between different forms of responsibility—for the self, for others, and for the relationships between them.”[4]

While the need to give and receive care represents a foundational aspect of human existence, its recognition in legal frameworks remains insufficient. Ensuring that care networks can thrive calls for the development of legal safeguards that protect the right to care, including through the social and economic rights already present in international human rights law. The recent Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on the right to care might be a timely opportunity to bring attention to this underappreciated aspect ofhuman life. 

This Essay begins by examining the need to recognize care as a right, its relationship with other human rights, and its importance to the global economy. It then provides the necessary legal background, first by analyzing the proposed Model Law for Care, the request for an Advisory Opinion before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Opinion itself. It also briefly surveys relevant legal frameworks and jurisprudence at the universal level, within Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe (both the Council of Europe and the European Union), and in national constitutions. Given its legal focus, the Essay does not engage deeply with philosophical or sociological conceptions of care, though it touches upon gender-related aspects. The final section considers potential objections to recognizing the right to care and areas needing further clarification, in particular, the alleged conflation of the public-private divide, the question of the inflation of rights, and the availability of resources.

2. The Need for the Global Recognition of Care

Caregiving has long been a “hidden reality.”[5] Virtually all of us provide and receive care at various points in our lives. Some require more intensive care due to heightened vulnerabilities, which may stem from social conditions like poverty or biological realities like disability, childhood, or old age.[6] Notably, the Implementation Guide for the Model Law on Care underscores that caregiving not only responds to human dependency but also sustains economic systems.[7]

The scope of a proposed right to care can be understood through two interrelated dimensions: the right to receive care and the right to provide care under conditions that do not permanently compromise the well-being of caregivers. As Argentina’s request for an Advisory Opinion has observed, “high-quality care is extremely intensive, and it is not possible to increase the productivity of care without compromising its quality.”[8] Ensuring adequate care for children, persons with disabilities, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups depends on ensuring that caregivers themselves enjoy an adequate standard of living. Therefore, society requires policies that facilitate the giving and receiving of care in conditions consistent with the human dignity of all involved parties. 

However, much remains to be done to achieve this end, as existing legal protections do not always translate into actual practices. For example, residents of underfunded or understaffed care homes might experience neglect, delayed assistance with daily activities, poor hygiene, or even forms of abuse.[9] Childcare facilities worldwide also face significant challenges, including affordability issues, staff shortages, and regulatory gaps.[10] Informal caregiving, which remains the most common form of care, as mentioned before, is largely dependent on caregivers’ material and personal resources, further exacerbating inequities.

Sex plays a significant role in care provision. On average, women spend more than three times more hours as men on unpaid care work.[11] Many women express the desire to personally take care of their loved ones, especially children,[12] but they experience long-term economic disadvantages, including lower lifetime earnings and reduced social security and retirement benefits, as a result. Paradoxically, despite serving as primary caregivers throughout their lives, elderly women face some of the greatest barriers to accessing proper care in old age due to financial constraints.[13] According to UN predictions, the global population aged 65 and over could nearly double by 2050, and the population aged 80 and over is expected to triple,[14] making the issue even more pressing.

Despite lacking appropriate recognition, unpaid care work significantly contributes to the economy. The value of unpaid care work equals approximately 9.0% of global gross domestic product (GDP).[15] In Latin America and the Caribbean, unpaid care work accounts for between 15.9% and 25.3% of GDP.[16] This lack of recognition appears especially problematic given that the burden of this unpaid labor falls disproportionately on women and girls from the poorest households in low-income communities, who spend more time on caregiving tasks than their wealthier counterparts. This disparity could be attributed to a lack of technological infrastructure to facilitate household work or financial resources to pay for alternatives, among other things.[17] As frequently seems to be the case, overlapping vulnerabilities intensify disadvantages for those most at risk.

Moreover, while professional caregivers receive wages, they also face serious challenges. Data consistently shows that domestic workers, many of whom are care workers, remain particularly vulnerable to exploitation.[18] Those employed in the informal economy face greater occupational health risks compared to those in formal employment and frequently lack legal protections or awareness of their rights.[19]They are also less likely to use any health services and more likely to suffer depression.[20] Some are required to work 14-18 hours a day, seven days a week, for wages far below the minimum wage.[21] Many do not have access to social security benefits, which leaves them particularly vulnerable in times of illness or old age.[22] Migrant care workers face an even more precarious situation, since they may lack health coverage and fear seeking assistance because of their uncertain legal status.[23] The “invisibility” of domestic and care work makes it difficult to monitor working conditions and enforce labor standards.[24]

This backdrop underscores the need to recognize and safeguard both the right to receive care and the right to provide it under fair conditions. Protecting caregivers and care recipients alike is not “only” a matter of individual well-being but also a fundamental requirement for the stability and sustainability of social and economic systems.

3. Legal Background for the “Right to Care”

The proposed Model Law for Care, drafted by the Inter-American Commission on Women, and the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights demonstrate a growing interest in incorporating care into international legal discourse. However, the scope, content, and corresponding obligations still require further clarification, particularly if the goal extends beyond merely proclaiming the right to care to the development of concrete legal and policy solutions. In this regard, a comparative analysis of how human rights systems already incorporate care may prove useful—not as a call for replication but as a means of evaluating the universality of the right and drawing inspiration for its regional and domestic implementation.

3.1. The Request for an Advisory Opinion 

In its request for an Advisory Opinion, Argentina asked the IACtHR to define the content and scope of the right to care and the corresponding state obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.[25] The request raised related questions, including (1) the minimum essential contents of the right that the state must guarantee, (2) the budgetary resources considered sufficient, (3) the progress indicators appropriate to monitor the effective fulfillment of the rights, and (4) public policies that the state must implement, taking into account the role of the comprehensive care systems.[26] It emphasized the importance of the principles of nondiscrimination,[27] human dignity,[28] and the indivisibility of rights.[29] It further linked the right to care with the rights to life, work, and social security, the highest attainable standard of health, education, and a healthy environment.[30] The request has been framed from gender, intersectional, and feminist perspectives,[31] defining care policies as those that allocate resources to recognizing, reducing, and redistributing unpaid care in the form of money, services, and time.[32]

Interestingly, Argentina also requested to withdraw, claiming that during the public hearing, the meaning of the original request had been distorted, “extending it to an area outside the scope of the treaty-based obligations assumed by the Argentine State.”[33] The Court, however, refused to grant the request for withdrawal, noting that Argentina is not the only state with an interest in an opinion which “could have consequences for other OAS Member States and for those persons subject to their jurisdiction.”[34] Such reasoning, therefore, implied that the content of the right requires further elaboration.  

3.2. Model Law for Care

The request for the Advisory Opinion correlated with the development of the Inter-American Model Law on Care, prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Women, acting under the auspices of the Organization of the American States (OAS).  Its development was precipitated by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and its role in creating a “global care emergency that has disproportionately affected women, taking them out of the labor market.”[35] The Model Law is described as “a regional tool that seeks to address the care crisis and establish the basis for a new covenant in the social organization of care.”[36] Its main purpose is to “regulate, redistribute, provide and promote care as a fundamental public good and to recognize unpaid caregiving as work.”[37] It stresses social co-responsibility for caregiving (Article 3), the state’s role as a guarantor (Article 6), the economic value of care work (Article 15), and work-life balance (Articles 7 and 32), as well as the rights of paid and unpaid caregivers (Articles 22-24).[38] According to the Model Law’s implementation guide, national laws could establish incentives for employers offering care-friendly policies, such as a preference in public procurement by the state or programs to support businesses or promote exports for companies that provide care infrastructure.[39]

Those examples demonstrate that the Model Law broadens the range of state obligations. States are not merely encouraged to regulate caregiving as a social policy matter but are also guided to integrate care considerations into areas such as market access, competition, and fiscal incentives. It signals that future adjudication will need to address structural and systemic dimensions of care rights. While the Model Law is not binding, its detailed articulation of state duties and policy tools provides a benchmark for the judicial interpretation of the scope of the right to care that could accordingly clarify what “adequate” or “reasonable” state action entails. 

3.3. Advisory Opinion 31 of 2025

In August 2025, the Inter-American Court published its Advisory Opinion 31 of 2025 in which it recognized care as a standalone human right and addressed its relationship to other rights. This advisory process had the second-highest participation in the Court’s history, with a total of 129 observations received.[40]

In its Opinion, the Court affirmed that the right to care implies that all persons with any degree of dependency have the right to receive quality care that is sufficient and appropriate to live with dignity.[41] Accordingly, such care should be adequate for the person’s stage of life, their degree of dependency, and their particular needs.[42] This translates to the notion of dual responsibility, which requires the state to support both the persons in need of care and their caregivers in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.[43]

Acknowledging the Inter-American Model Law on Care as a relevant source of guidance for implementing the right to care, the Court also highlighted the need to establish National Care Systems aimed at reorganizing care tasks under a logic of co-responsibility and equity. In doing so, it pointed to examples of countries that have already created them.[44] As governance models, they illustrate how different institutions—public, private, community, or mixed—should provide care-oriented services.[45] According to the Court, the Model Law should also serve as a guide for the design and regulation of labor flexibility in relation to caregiving responsibilities, which would include the possibility of remote work.[46]

Further, the Opinion drew attention to structural discrimination experienced by women caregivers, particularly those affected by multiple forms of discrimination, such as women who head single-parent households; women caregivers in the prison system; unemployed, migrant, indigenous, or Afro-descendant women; elderly women caregivers; and women with disabilities or those responsible for caring for persons with disabilities. [47] With respect to self-care, it focused on the self-care of caregivers, linking it to the right to health.[48]

Although the conclusions of the Inter-American Court in its Advisory Opinion lack binding force, they nonetheless serve as authoritative expressions of legal standards, likely shaping future legal and political developments. Advisory opinions prove particularly significant in matters of “public interest” that affect broad segments of the population.[49]The involvement of an international court in defining care may seem counterintuitive on its face since care is often viewed as a matter of personal, everyday interactions rather than as one of the issues traditionally associated with international law, such as trade, diplomacy, or interstate conflicts. Yet, the historical evolution from a framework of strict bilateralism to one of community interest, along with the growing recognition of social and economic rights in binding covenants, legitimizes claims concerning these fundamental aspects of daily life.[50]

The Court’s Advisory Opinion does not mean that violations of a state’s obligations to fulfill the right to care would always—or even frequently—trigger direct international intervention. Nonetheless, other mechanisms, such as the socialization of states and the acculturation of norms, may foster compliance with human rights obligations related to care, provided the legal standard becomes sufficiently clear.[51] These dynamics are particularly relevant in regional frameworks with established networks of political and economic cooperation among states.[52] Given that law both shapes and is shaped by culture, international legal norms must ultimately take concrete form in the behaviors and practices of states and, eventually, individuals.[53]

3.4. Universal and Comparative Perspective

The considerations present in the Advisory Opinion lead us to examine the elements of the right to care already present in various human rights systems, even if not formulated as a standalone right. 

The analysis of related rights demonstrates that the right to care should not be viewed as an entirely “new” human right. Implicit in all the regulations described below are the principles of equality and nondiscrimination, which underpin the entire human rights system.[54] 

a) Universal System 

Elements of the right to care can be identified in treaties adopted under the auspices of the United Nations and in the interpretations of their respective treaty-monitoring bodies. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes families, mothers, and children as requiring special protection and care.[55] Article 11 (right to an adequate standard of living) and Article 12 (right to health) indirectly support the right to care by emphasizing the conditions necessary for individuals to provide and receive care adequately.[56] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the ICESCR’s monitoring body, has also underscored the importance of parental and sick leave, as well as measures to reconcile work and family responsibilities, including access to affordable childcare and eldercare services and the implementation of flexible working arrangements.[57] In its General Comment on social security, CESCR emphasized that states should eliminate barriers preventing women from making equal contributions to contributory social security schemes, which are often caused by interruptions in employment due to family responsibilities. The Committee further suggested that benefit formulas should account for these factors by, for example, recognizing child-rearing periods or caregiving periods for adult dependents as working periods for purposes of pension entitlements.[58]

With respect to the rights of caregivers considered from a gender perspective, the most relevant treaty is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which explicitly calls for the creation and development of a network of childcare services.[59] Its monitoring body, the CEDAW Committee, emphasized the need to recognize women’s unpaid care work in national economic accounts,[60] stressed that caregiving responsibilities must be shared equally between men and women,[61] and highlighted the economic and legal barriers that unpaid care work creates for women seeking justice.[62]

From the perspective of care recipients, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly significant. Article 3(2) guarantees children “such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her.”[63] The Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasized that parents bear the primary responsibility for the upbringing and care of their children, while states are obligated to support them by ensuring access to adequate childcare services and family assistance.[64] States also assume responsibility for the care of children deprived of a family or other caregiving environment.[65] The Committee recognized that, particularly in early childhood, children have specific needs for physical nurturance, emotional care, and sensitive guidance, as well as time and space for social play, exploration, and learning.[66]

Furthermore, International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions acknowledge the need for work arrangements that facilitate caregiving. The Maternity Protection Convention (C183) and the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (C156) recognize the necessity of work structures that accommodate caregiving responsibilities.[67] Additionally, the Domestic Workers Convention (C189) safeguards the rights of domestic workers, including care workers[68]—an especially important protection given that many jurisdictions exclude domestic workers from general labor protections.[69] Unfortunately, significant challenges remain in the effective implementation of these conventions at national levels.[70]

b) Latin America and the Caribbean 

Provisions related to various elements of the right to care can also be found in legal instruments from Latin America and the Caribbean. Enacted in 1948, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man—generally not binding but nonetheless influential[71]—safeguards mothers’ rights to special protection before and after birth, family protection, work “under proper conditions,” and leisure time.[72] Similar protections appear in the Protocol of San Salvador, which aims to reinforce the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights in Latin America, complementing the civil and political rights protected under theAmerican Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).[73]The Protocol obligates states to “implement and strengthen programs that help develop to ensure suitable family care, so that women may enjoy a real opportunity to exercise their right to work” and to take measures for the protection of families, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.[74] In a similar vein, the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons provides for the elderly’s right to a comprehensive care system that guarantees “protection and promotion of health, coverage of social services, food and nutritional security, water, clothing and housing; promoting that the older person can decide to remain at home and maintain their independence and autonomy.”[75]

Initially, it might appear surprising that the Inter-American Court was tasked with elaborating on the right to care, given that the ACHR does not expressly recognize socioeconomic rights. The Court, however, directly addressed this question in Lagos del Campo v. Peru when it arrived at the conclusion that Article 26 of ACHR, which obligates states to adopt measures toward “the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires,” allows for the justiciability of socioeconomic rights.[76] In addition to stating that Article 26 mandates that rights should be derived from the standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter), the Court also referred to its Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, which decided that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man defines the rights recognized in the OAS Charter with greater precision.[77] The Court thus affirmed its competence to adjudicate matters related to socioeconomic rights, which could encompass the potential right to care.[78]

In addition to Advisory Opinion on the Right to Care, a careful analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence provides important insights into its perspective on persons experiencing overlapping vulnerabilities and states’ corresponding obligations. Notably, Argentina’s request specifically asks the Court to take into account an intersectional perspective. The Court has already referred to intersectionality and overlapping vulnerabilities in its case law.[79] In general, it concluded that the greater the vulnerabilities an individual faces, the greater the protections that should be in place; this line of reasoning could also extend to the need for care.

Moreover, in Ximenez Lopez v. Brazil, the Court referred specifically to the state’s role as a guarantor of the right to care in case of persons with mental illnesses under state custody. There, it defined the duty to provide care as a positive obligation to ensure the necessary conditions to lead a decent life.[80] A similar approach was taken in Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala, which concerned the rights of persons living with HIV. There, the Court emphasized the state’s duty to address inequality and ensure adequate protection for the most vulnerable groups, particularly women and children.[81] 

In general, the IACtHR has consistently recognized the state’s duty to respect, protect, and fulfill social and economic rights. In the Advisory Opinion, the Court integrated these duties under a standalone right to care. Such recognition allows for the development of a coherent, enforceable doctrine that should facilitate the design of concrete measures to address the current shortcomings.

c) Council of Europe and the European Union

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been more reluctant than its Inter-American counterpart thus far to creatively interpret the European Convention on Human Rights to encompass implicit social and economic rights.[82] Given this reluctance, the European Social Charter—another treaty concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe—is a more appropriate source for identifying such rights. The Charter guarantees care in cases of illness for those lacking adequate resources or the ability to secure them, care for children and young persons, and healthcare for elderly persons.[83] Additionally, it provides for the possibility of either parent to obtain parental leave during a period following maternity leave to care for a child.[84] Although the European Committee of Social Rights—the body responsible for monitoring the Charter—has not comprehensively addressed the right to care, it has repeatedly engaged with various aspects of healthcare.[85] Importantly, it has also published an opinion on its own initiative addressing the rights of live-in care workers, focusing specifically on migrant and undocumented workers.[86]

In contrast, the European Union (EU) appears to have developed the most comprehensive framework for protecting the right to care and ensuring nondiscrimination against caregivers. While the EU’s legal system is separate from that of the Council of Europe (under which the ECtHR operates) and is overseen by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the two systems significantly influence each other in practice.

The first relevant treaty is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and gender equality in Articles 20, 21, and 23.[87] Article 33 on family and professional life specifies that “[t]o reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.”[88] The CJEU has recognized that Article 33 reflects a fundamental social right[89] and that the Charter might apply in relations between private parties.[90]

Another category of legal measures that can protect the right to care in the EU consists of directives: legislative acts that set out goals that EU countries must achieve but leave it up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to reach them.[91] The most relevant directives for the discussion on the right to care is the Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54,[92] the Pregnancy Directive 92/85,[93] and the Work-Life Balance Directive for Parents and Carers 2019/1158,[94] which repealed the Parental Leave Directive 2010/18.[95]

The Equal Treatment Directive prohibits sex discrimination, including de facto discrimination, in access to employment, vocational training, promotion, working conditions, and dismissal.[96] The Pregnancy Directive guarantees a minimum of fourteen weeks of maternity leave and provides other work protections.[97] The Work-Life Balance Directive extends the rights of workers to take leave for reasons related to caring responsibilities and creates a new right to request flexible working arrangements. It also prohibits discrimination when workers exercise these rights or attempt to do so and makes no distinction between the rights of men and women.[98] These directives, together with non-binding regulations, could suggest the development of the “reconciliation principle” guiding the relations between work and family life in the EU.[99]

Several categories of cases considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provide insight into the scope of the right to care. First, one line of cases concerns the principle of equal pay for equal work, particularly where part-time workers—most often women who reduce their working hours due to caregiving responsibilities—receive disproportionately lower compensation than their full-time counterparts.[100] In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz, the Court specifically recognized the challenges employees with family commitments face in meeting the requirements for an occupational pension. This acknowledgment of caregiving-related difficulties is particularly relevant in assessing claims of indirect discrimination.[101]

Second, in Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, the CJEU established a foundation for recognizing the caregiving relationship as a prohibited ground of discrimination. The decision extended the principle of non-discrimination based on disability to protect individuals who experience discrimination because of their association with a disabled person, including through caregiving.[102]  Finally, in Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, the CJEU addressed the issue of special or additional needs in the context of parental leave, considering whether the birth of twins warranted a longer leave duration.[103] This case illustrates the Court’s engagement with the unique caregiving challenges that arise in different family circumstances.

Beyond jurisprudence, the EU has taken legislative and policy steps toward strengthening the right to care. In 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution advocating for a common European action on care, emphasizing access to quality childcare, equitable access to care services, long-term care standards, challenges faced by informal caregivers, and the importance of decent working conditions in the care sector.[104] That same year, the European Commission introduced the European Care Strategy for caregivers and care recipients, alongside two recommendations for Member States: one revising the “Barcelona targets” on early childhood education and care and another improving access to affordable, high-quality, long-term care.[105] Taken together, these actions and jurisprudence demonstrate that, despite many flaws, Europe has substantial will and resources to promote the right to care, even in the absence of its formal recognition.

d) Overview of Care in National Constitutions 

In addition to manifestations of the right to care in global and regional human rights systems, elements of the right also appear in constitutional provisions worldwide. However, this warrants an important caveat. The absence of an explicit constitutional guarantee of the right to care does not mean that such a right is completely unprotected. In many countries—particularly European ones—robust legal frameworks safeguard caregiving responsibilities despite the lack of specific constitutional provisions. 

Most of the world’s constitutions reference healthcare, and many go further to address other aspects of care.[106] Frequently, constitutions frame care not only as a right but also as a duty, particularly in the context of the parent-child relationship. Many adopt a model of reciprocal caregiving, designating parents as primary caregivers of children while also stipulating that “able-bodied” adult children have an obligation to care for parents who are “in need.”[107] Constitutions commonly articulate that if parents are unable to fulfill their role, the state becomes the main guarantor of care, and the texts extend this protection to orphans and, more broadly, “children deprived of parental care.”[108] Constitutions also designate particularly vulnerable groups—such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, women during pregnancy and postpartum, victims of violence, or persons unable to sustain an adequate standard of living for themselves—as those in need of care on the part of the family, community, and the state.[109]

New Zealand has particularly notable constitutional provisions regarding the right to care. Its constitution explicitly lists the responsibility for part-time or full-time care of children or other dependents as a prohibited ground of discrimination.[110] It also clarifies that preferential treatment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or caregiving responsibilities does not constitute a violation of nondiscrimination provisions.[111] This reflects both the concept of “associative discrimination” on the basis of caregiving, as discussed by the CJEU in Coleman, as well as the recognition that de facto discrimination may require remedial special measures.[112] While “association” is not an unlimited term, it does include at least the closest relationships—such as those between parents and children.[113] The prohibition of associative discrimination, therefore, covers not only situations in which individuals are treated less favorably because of their own care needs, but also those in which caregivers face discrimination due to their responsibility for the needs of others. If this reasoning were further developed in other jurisdictions and refined through jurisprudence, it could significantly advance legal protections for caregivers.

Despite those protective constitutional provisions, many developing countries whose constitutions include robust protections of socioeconomic rights, including the right to care, are, in fact, those in which vulnerable persons suffer the most from the unavailability of resources.[114] While the reasons for this disparity warrant a broader discussion, the inclusion of such provisions at least signals a recognition of the need for legal safeguards that should eventually extend beyond mere textual commitments. Nonetheless, the right to receive care—grounded in universal experiences of vulnerability and dependence—as well as the right to provide care without permanently and unreasonably sacrificing one’s own well-being are principles embedded throughout the human rights system.

4. Potential Objections and Responses 

Recognizing a right to care imposes obligations on many types of actors and positions the state as its guarantor. Well-intentioned concerns might arise about whether care should remain within the private sphere, whether recognizing another right would contribute to rights inflation—blurring the distinction between human rights and other social goods[115]—and whether resource constraints would make the right to care impossible to implement. This Section addresses these objections and offers responses to them.

4.1. Conflating the Public-Private Divide 

Skepticism regarding the state’s role in securing socioeconomic rights is common. It often reflects competing conceptions of human rights: one sees human rights law primarily as a safeguard against state interference, while another sees the state as an agent responsible for the protection and fulfillment of rights.[116] Yet, if we rely on a subsidiarity-based approach, these two visions do not necessarily contradict one another. Subsidiarity should be regarded as a two-dimensional concept, encompassing a negative obligation understood as “the obligation of the government to limit its intervention into lower forms of social organization, and to do only that which the lesser group cannot accomplish for itself without assistance” as well as a positive obligation “justifying intervention by the state in situations where “lower” forms of organization cannot achieve their ends by themselves.”[117] Applying this approach to the right to care leads to several conclusions.

First, care should not be reduced to just another service that can be governed solely by labor and contract law. Its special relational nature makes it crucial to the well-being of both caregivers and care recipients.[118] Its full commodification is neither possible nor desirable.[119] While the economic value of care work remains highly significant, it alone fails to capture its full importance. Often, caregivers do not wish to outsource care, and even when they do, the nature of the care provided is not the same in the absence of a close personal bond. This is certainly not to say that professional caregivers cannot form meaningful relationships with those they care for; indeed, evidence suggests that affection often arises naturally in such settings, but it typically takes more time and remains more limited.[120]

Care work—whether paid or unpaid—thus extends beyond a conventional job. As Eva Feder Kittay explains, “It is a labor, an attitude, and a virtue.”[121] When viewed as labor, care work constitutes a unique category. Unlike other forms of work, which often sustain life and relationships indirectly by securing resources, care work directly meets fundamental needs such as feeding, clothing, and providing medical assistance.[122] On the other hand, care work, like any other work, is also consuming, requires physical activity and competency, and might result in stress or even burnout.[123] Ignoring this reality assumes implicitly that caregivers will continue their work regardless of whether they receive protection. Such an assumption contravenes the very purpose of human rights law, which exists to protect the vulnerable, not take advantage of their vulnerabilities.

This dual nature of care, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, requires a two-fold approach on the part of the state within its role as a guarantor. First, it must preserve (if already existent) or create adequate conditions that would allow persons to receive and provide care within informal interpersonal relationships without sacrificing either party’s overall well-being. As described in the section on comparative constitutional practice, states frequently emphasize the responsibility of families—particularly parents, but also other family members—to provide care. At the same time, many states also extend special protections to families to facilitate caregiving. However, if caregivers cannot provide care within the private sphere, the burden shifts to state institutions, making care a public responsibility. While institutional care may remain far from ideal for recipients,[124] it may be the only means of ensuring a decent standard of living for many. Importantly, regardless of whether care is provided within the private or public sphere, the state remains responsible for regulating and overseeing institutionalized care to uphold human rights protections.

This brings us to the second point about the indivisibility of all human rights and the refusal to ascribe a lower status to socioeconomic rights. Some scholars argue that the traditional division between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socioeconomic rights, on the other, reflects entrenched gender biases. Socioeconomic rights—including the right to care—have historically been associated with the private sphere and thus with women, whereas civil and political rights have been framed as the domain of men.[125] However, for human rights to remain truly humane, they must acknowledge that all individuals experience physical vulnerability and dependence on others at different points in their lives. This also encompasses “derivative dependency,” a term coined by Martha Fineman to describe the situation in which persons who care for others are themselves dependent on resources necessary to undertake that care.”[126] Socioeconomic rights center on such embodiment and the need to be cared for.[127]

Therefore, care need not belong to a solely private realm but instead remains intertwined with the public “economic” sphere—akin to “the way that economies benefit from work that is neither recognized nor paid for”—along with social relations and the public policies “that directly or indirectly shape the provision of care.”[128] Viewing the legal protection of care through the lens of subsidiarity and basic socioeconomic needs offers a more realistic framework than treating it as an external intervention into the private sphere. Its key component is caring for the carer, which, in turn, would enable the carer to provide care.

4.2. Inflation of Rights

Another objection to the judicial recognition of the right to care could come from skepticism that expanding the catalog of rights that states must protect would result in noncompliance due to difficulties in their fulfilment. We live “in the age of rights,”[129] as some begin to speak about the human right to the Internet[130] or the human right to sport.[131] There seems to be a risk that the legal recognition of too many rights could lead to the devaluation of the most fundamental ones.[132] Hurst Hannum notes that unless we come back to the principles of consensus and universality, “human rights are on the verge of becoming a victim of their own success.”[133] The IACtHR appears to be particularly creative in interpreting rights in an evolutive way, which, justified by the spirit of the pro persona principle, leads to conclusions that may deviate from the intentions of the treaty drafters.[134] For example, the right to life is interpreted not only as the prohibition on arbitrarily depriving one of life in a physical sense but also as the right imposing a positive obligation of ensuring conditions adequate for “life with dignity,”[135] particularly in relation to the right to health.[136]

Such an expansion of rights could pose problems because the language of rights necessarily imposes corresponding obligations. In the words of Joseph Raz, “X has a right if and only if . . . an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”[137] According to Philip Alston, in order to be legally recognized, a right should constitute a fundamentally important social value and be relevant, “inevitably to varying degrees,” throughout a world of diverse value systems.[138][A1] [A2]  In the same vein, Louis Henkin explains that “human rights are rights; they are not merely aspirations, or assertions of the good,” and therefore, the idea of human rights implies entitlement.[139] This special status gives them precedence over other considerations, ensuring their protection even when it results in certain costs for others.[140] Declaring new rights, therefore, should not be a move that comes too easily, and the evolutive interpretation of treaties always requires the preservation of their internal consistency.[141] From this perspective, the main questions would be whether and on what basis the right to care can be declared an international human right and what purpose such a declaration could have.

First, the right to care fulfills the criteria of universality and fundamentality proposed by Alston. Although each person and their particular experience of providing and receiving care is unique, the need for care remains universal across social systems. It also touches upon the most humane and fundamental aspects of our existence that often underpin our sense of happiness and fulfillment. Second, the question about the risks of creating new rights would not have to be applicable here if we agreed that various aspects of the right to care are included in other already recognized human rights whose application should be adjusted based on particular circumstances. 

This process could follow a three-step method. The first step would involve assessing the relevant realities and needs. The second step would require determining the content and scope of corresponding, already-recognized human rights, such as the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to work, the right to family life, and the right to social security. The third step—applying these rights to the concrete needs of individuals receiving or providing care—could serve as the point at which the substance of the right to care is clarified. Assessing the adequacy of these measures would require both a contextual and purpose-oriented consideration of what these measures should be deemed adequate for.[142]

Over time, as jurisprudence develops, this approach could lead to the recognition of care as both a derivative and an independent right that particularizes other socioeconomic rights. This method of reasoning is not unprecedented. A similar process led to the recognition of the human right to water, which was initially considered a subordinate aspect of the right to an adequate standard of living before being acknowledged as an independent right.[143]

These considerations are particularly important given that the language of rights serves multiple functions, including appellative (evoking a moral response), contesting (challenging the status quo), connecting (bridging various discourses), triggering (prompting institutional and individual action), and jurisgenerative (shaping legal development).[144] The appellative function could enhance the visibility of the often-hidden work and the necessity of care. The contesting function would help dismantle the assumption that difficulties in providing care or suffering due to insufficient support are so “normal” or “natural” that they do not require any intervention. This is particularly significant in light of growing recognition of care’s role in human development,[145] increased awareness of the equal rights of persons with disabilities[146] and shifting social norms as more women seek or must work outside the home while continuing to bear most caregiving responsibilities. The contesting function, therefore, could integrate social policy and assistance discourses with established legal standards, thereby triggering institutional actions such as subsidizing care, ensuring care leave, and expanding care infrastructure. Finally, the triggering and jurisgenerative functions would contribute to consolidating laws regarding socioeconomic rights and justify legislative reforms to address existing gaps.[147]

Recognizing the right to care would also affirm that, insofar as it is reasonably possible, society should be (re)organized to ensure that all members have access to the conditions necessary for its fulfillment.[148] In this sense, the right to care constitutes a moral claim on societal organization.[149] Furthermore, it requires “some system of remedies to which individuals may resort to obtain the benefits to which they are entitled or to be compensated for their loss.”[150] Thus, recognizing the right to care could unify its human, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions while setting an implementation standard, requiring states to protect it at least at a defined baseline.[151] To that end, and in recognition of the fact that elevating a claim to the status of a right imposes corresponding duties on others, it would be essential to define care precisely, avoiding the risk of turning it into an “all-encompassing” buzzword.[152]

4.3. Availability of Resources 

The preceding discussion has already established that rights inherently entail obligations and impose certain costs on others. These costs become particularly contentious in the context of resource scarcity, where state budgets must accommodate competing demands that often exceed available funds. Article 2(1) of ICESCR stipulates that states must undertake steps to the maximum of available resources “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”[153] Article 26 of the Inter-American Convention similarly obligates the parties to adopt “measures … with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.”[154] Although the phrase “to the maximum of the available resources” does not appear in Article 26, its reference to the OAS Charter integrates this principle into its interpretation.[155] Additionally, Article 34 of the OAS Charter calls for states to devote the utmost efforts to achieving substantial and self-sustained per capita economic growth, equitable income distribution, and adequate and equitable taxation systems.[156]

The key challenges here are twofold: (1) defining the “maximum” resources available and (2) determining what actions the state must take when resources are insufficient to meet the needs of individuals, particularly those experiencing heightened vulnerabilities. Importantly, according to CESCR, “minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party” at all times.[157]

First, defining the maximum resources requires careful analysis of budget allocations.[158] To ensure fairness, policymakers must rely on disaggregated indicators, as broad national averages often fail to reveal whether human rights are truly being realized in accordance with the principle of equality.[159] Some reductions in public spending, such as cuts to social policies, may appear neutral at first glance, but, in practice, disproportionately impact individuals who rely on these programs to realize their right to care. Such measures could, therefore, result in indirect discrimination.[160]

In some cases, identifying additional resources may require modifying taxation policies, with the financial gains allocated toward realizing individuals’ right to care. As Oxfam has observed in its submission to the IACtHR:

Given that Latin America and the Caribbean is the world’s most unequal region, it is clear that states have not been engaged in fair, sustainable and equitable revenue collection that might guarantee the realization of rights. The fact that between 2020 and 2022 “the wealth of the region’s billionaires increased by 21%, a growth five times greater than that of regional GDP in the same period (+3.9%)” is a symptom of the same problem.[161]

Expanding the scope of available resources may also involve seeking international assistance and cooperation, which could, for instance, facilitate the development of care infrastructure.[162]  Additionally, resources should not be understood solely in financial terms; knowledge, information, human capital, and technology can also serve as critical means of advancing the right to care.[163] This broader perspective allows for innovative, care-related solutions even in economically constrained states.

Second, addressing the scarcity of resources often relies on proportionality and balancing the limitations of rights.[164] The burden of proof falls on the state to demonstrate the necessity of any limitation, and the CESCR should be empowered to evaluate the justification for such measures.[165] Nonetheless, even limitations deemed “proportional” should be treated as a last resort rather than an easy excuse for a state’s failure to fulfill its obligation to employ “all appropriate means” to realize socioeconomic rights. Thus, before imposing any restrictions, the state must not only verify that it has mobilized all available resources but also explore alternative solutions that could achieve the same objectives.

This requires creativity and resourcefulness in designing policies that uphold rights while addressing practical constraints. In the context of the right to care, states must exhaust all available alternatives to prevent care responsibilities from disproportionately burdening individuals, particularly women, before imposing any limitations. This includes leveraging technological advancements and investing in infrastructure to reduce care burdens. As Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona and Kate Donald observe, “accessible and affordable energy and water services in disadvantaged rural areas could have a major impact in cutting the time women and girls spend collecting water and fuel each day; time which they could reallocate to more empowering activities, including economic opportunities and much-needed leisure and self-care.”[166] Similarly, improving transportation infrastructureand reducing travel time for work and care facilities would enable caregivers—especially in rural and peri-urban areas—to access formal employment or better-paying jobs.[167] Eventually, such actions could also be beneficial not only for the caregivers and care recipients but also for the economy.

In sum, if care is treated as central to human life and development, then policies and programs should be designed with “an explicit intention to care.”[168] These considerations imply that any limitations of socioeconomic rights must “not be discriminatory and must comprise all possible measures, including tax measures, to support social transfers to mitigate inequalities that can grow in times of crisis and to ensure that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected.”[169][A3] [A4] [A5]  Thus, although the availability of resources constitutes a serious concern, it does not suffice to undermine the recognition of care as a right. 

5. Conclusion 

Receiving and providing care is an intrinsic feature of being human. The Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights offers an opportunity to internalize its importance in states’ domestic systems. Recognizing care as an international human right could help bridge existing legislative gaps and challenge the entrenched assumption that care-related deficiencies are too trivial to be the subject of international law. 

As this Essay has demonstrated, the right to care need not be considered an entirely “new” human right. Its core elements already exist—directly or indirectly—in universal and regional human rights systems, as well as in national jurisdictions worldwide. The substance of the right can also be established by assessing relevant needs and realities, followed by determining the content and scope of related human rights, and eventually applying these rights to the concrete needs of caregivers and recipients. This approach helps allay fears that recognizing the right to care will lead to a rights inflation. Moreover, designing policies based on a subsidiarity framework can prevent the conflation of public and private responsibilities, ensuring support sufficient in scope and duration to meet the specific challenge. Ultimately, even resource scarcity cannot justify indifference towards the care requirements of the most vulnerable, which includes both caregivers and care recipients.

 

[1] Alasdair Macintyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need Virtues 121 (1999)

[2] Id., at 1.

[3] Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory Of Self, Autonomy, And Law 28 (2012). 

[4] Katri Lõhmus, Caring Autonomy: European Human Rights Law and the Challenge of Individualism 186 (2015).

[5] See, e.g., Lourdes Benería, Gender, Development, and Globalization Economics as if All People Mattered 179-220 (2003); Walter Kipp, Denis Tindyebwa, Tom Rubaale, Ednah Karamagi & Ellen Bajenja, Family Caregivers in Rural Uganda: The Hidden Reality, 28 Health Care for Women Int’l 856 (2007).

[6] The notion of vulnerability might be regarded as the foundation of human rights law. See Roberto Andorno, Is Vulnerability the Foundation of Human Rights? in Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights 257 (Aniceto Masferrer & Emilio García-Sánchez eds., 2016). On the other hand, some scholars argue that vulnerability lacks concrete legal meaning and is used “without clear legal consequences.” See Luke D. Graham, The Gateway Function of Vulnerability in Public Law and Human Rights, Public Law: The University of Manchester Legal Research Paper Series No. 24/05, at 227 (2024).

[7] See Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm’n of Women, Implementation Guide to the Model Inter-American Law on Care, OEA/Ser.L/II.6.23 (2021) [hereinafter Law on Care Guide].

[8] Id., at 15. 

[9] See National Academies of Scis., Eng’g, & Med., The National Imperative to Improve Nursing Home Quality: Honoring Our Commitment to Residents, Families, and Staff (2022).

[10] World Bank, Better Jobs and Brighter Futures: Investing in Childcare to Build Human Capital (2023), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/385821d3-bce3-… [https://perma.cc/P9U9-Q4BN]. 

[11] Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm’n of Women, COVID-19 in Women’s Lives: Reasons to Recognize the Need for Care Policies in the Recovery Response, OEA/Ser.L/II.6.22, at 15 (2020); Int’l Lab. Org., Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work 53 (2018).

[12] For example, according to the study conducted in Europe by Make Mothers Matter, 89% of women expressed the desire to be present and to personally care for their own children at some time during their lives while 74% wanted to participate in the paid labor force too. Make Mothers Matter, Survey: What Matters to Mothers in Europe (2011), https://makemothersmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2011-MMM_What_… [https://perma.cc/4AXW-Z4ZC].

[13] See, e.g., Grace Enda & William G. Gale, How Does Gender Equality Affect Women in Retirement?, Brookings (July 2020); Katja Möhring, Is There a Motherhood Penalty in Retirement Income in Europe? The Role of Lifecourse and Institutional Characteristics, 38 Ageing & Society 2560 (2017).

[14] For further discussion of the challenges to the rights of elderly persons, see, for example, Jaclynn M. Miller, International Human Rights and the Elderly, 11 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 343 (Spring 2010).

[15] Gala Díaz Langou & Diana Rodriguez Franco, Why Caring About the Care Economy Is Key to Growth and Well-being, World Econ. F. (Oct. 24, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/10/caring-care-economy-key-growth-…,)%2C%20equivalent%20to%20%2411%20trillion [https://perma.cc/XE54-SJJ5]. 

[16] UN Women, Towards the Construction of Comprehensive Care Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements for Implementation 12 (2021).

[17] See Oxfam Int’l, Time to Care: Unpaid and Underpaid Care Work and the Global Inequality Crisis, at 33 (2020).

[18] Int’l Lab. Org., Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work 165-166 (2018). 

[19] For the overview of the global situation of workers in informal economy, see Nisha Naicker, Frank Pega, David Rees, Spo Kgalamono & Tanusha Singh, Health Services Use and Health Outcomes among Informal Economy Workers Compared with Formal Economy Workers: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 18 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 3189 (2021).

[20] Id.

[21] Human Rts. Watch, Domestic Workers, https://www.hrw.org/topic/womens-rights/domestic-workers [https://perma.cc/Q8CZ-75GP].

[22] See, e.g., Domestic Workers United, Home Economics Report, xi (2021), https://www.domesticworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/HomeEconomic… [https://perma.cc/XA4H-ADEW]; UN Women, Towards the Construction of Comprehensive Care Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements for Implementation 12 (2021). See also Ana Sojo, Including Informal Economy Workers in Contributory Social Protection: Current Challenges in Latin America, 68 Int’l Soc. Sec. Rev. 69 (2015).

[23] See Louisa Acciari, Juana del Carmen Britez & Andrea del Carmen Morales Pérez, Right to Health, Right to Live: Domestic Workers Facing the COVID-19 Crisis in Latin America, 29 Gender & Development 11 (2021).

[24] See Hum. Rts. Watch, The Invisibility of Domestic Workers,(May 4, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/04/invisibility-domestic-workers [https://perma.cc/2FGW-7JUA].

[25] The Content and Scope of Care as a Human Right, and Its Interrelationship with Other Rights, Request for an Advisory Opinion, OC-2/23, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) ¶ 2 (Jan. 20, 2023).

[26] Id. 

[27] Id. at 11.

[28] Id. at. 12-14. 

[29] Id. at 10-15. 

[30] Id. 

[31] Id. at 9.

[32] Id. at 1.

[33] See Order of the Court, OC-31, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. A) (Sep. 2, 2024).

[34] Id., ¶ 3.

[35] Inter-Am. Comm’n of Women, Inter-American Model Law to Support Caregiving Policies and Systems, OEA/Ser.L/II.6.26, preface (2022).

[36] Id. at 6. 

[37] Id. at. 2.

[38] Id. 

[39] See Law on Care Guide, supra note 7, at 50.

[40] Press Release Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 55/2025, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Recognizes the Existence of a Stand-Alone Human Right to Care (Aug. 7, 2025).

[41] Advisory Opinion OC-31/25, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 31, ¶ 116 (June 12, 2025).

[42] Id.

[43] Id., ¶¶119-120

[44] Id., ¶¶127-128

[45] Id., ¶127

[46] Id., ¶¶ 235-236.

[47] Id., ¶ 163

[48] Id, ¶ 275.

[49] On the role of advisory opinions in international courts, see, for example, Carlos A. Cruz Carrillo, The Role of Advisory Opinions in Addressing Public Interest Issues, in Public Interest Litigation in International Law 170 (Justine Bendel & Yusra Suedi eds., 2023); Karin Oellers-Frahm, Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions?, in International Judicial Lawmaking. On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance 69 (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012).

[50] See Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, in The Hague Academy Collected Courses Online 219, 322-375 (1994).

[51] For a detailed analysis of the process of “socialization” of states, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States. Promoting Human Rights through International Law (2013). According to Harold Koh, internalization requires repeated interactions between states and a variety of domestic and transnational actors, which produce interpretations of applicable global norms that, over time, become incorporated into states’ domestic values and processes. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997).

[52] Goodman & Jinks, supra note 51, at 48. On the correlation between acculturation and membership in international economic institutions, see David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 5 (Jan. 2002).

[53] For the analysis of the relation between law and culture, see Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in the Western World 8 (1987) (“[L]aw, in addition to all other things it does, tell stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which it in turn helps to shape.”).

[54] See e.g., Anne F. Bayefsky, The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law, 11 Hum. Rts. L.J. 1 (1990); Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development 154 (1995).

[55] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].

[56] Id. art. 11-12.

[57] Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, ¶¶ 6, 32, 35, 47(a), 62 (April 27, 2016). 

[58] See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 ¶ 32 (Feb. 4, 2008). See also Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts, General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. E/1995/22, ¶ 28 (Dec. 9, 1994) (stating that “as far as possible the support provided should also cover individuals (overwhelmingly female) who undertake the care of a person with disabilities”).

[59] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 11(2)(c), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.

[60] CEDAW General Recommendation No. 17: Measurement and Quantification of the Unremunerated Domestic Activities of Women and their Recognition in the Gross National Product, U.N. Doc. A/46/38 (1991).

[61] CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, U.N. Doc. A/49/38, ¶ 19 (1994). 

[62] CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 on Women’s Access to Justice, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/33, ¶ 19(c) (Aug. 3, 2015).

[63] Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3(2), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].

[64] See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7, Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, ¶¶ 15–20 (Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter CRC General Comment No. 7]. See also Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14, The Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14, ¶¶ 60–67 (May 29, 2013).

[65] Id.; see also U.N. Gen. Assembly, Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 64/142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/142 (Feb. 24, 2010).

[66] See CRC General Comment No. 7, supra note 64, ¶ 5.

[67] See Maternity Protection Convention (No. 183), June 15, 2000, 2181 U.N.T.S. 253; Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (No. 156), June 23, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 295.

[68] Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 189), June 16, 2011, 2955 U.N.T.S. 373. This is supported by Goal 8 of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda, which acknowledges care work as essential and promotes policies that support caregivers. See Int’l Lab. Org., Decent Work and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. https://www.ilo.org/topics-and-sectors/decent-work-and-2030-agenda-sust….

[69] See Einat Albin & Virginia Mantouvalou, The ILO Convention on Domestic Workers: From the Shadows to the Light, 41 Indus. L. J. 67 (2012).

[70] See Dursun Peksen & Robert G. Blanton, The Impact of ILO Conventions on Worker Rights: Are Empty Promises Worse Than No Promises? 12 Rev. Int’l Org. 75 (2017).

[71] As a declaration, by its very definition, it was not designed to be a binding instrument. However, according to the interpretation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, since the OAS Charter establishes the protection of human rights as a core principle, member states must adhere to the Declaration as the primary human rights instrument until they ratify the American Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g., Andrea Mortlock v. United States, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/08, ¶ 50 (2008); Michael Edwards et al. v. The Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/01, ¶¶ 107–113 (2001).

[72] American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man arts. 6, 7, 14, 15, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res.

[73] American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].

[74] Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 7(2), 15, 17, 18, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.

[75] Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons art. 12, June 15, 2015, O.A.S.T.S. No. A-70.

[76] See Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340, ¶¶ 143–49 (Aug. 31, 2017).

[77] Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 43 (July 14, 1989). (“The member States of the Organization have signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter. Thus, the Charter of the Organization cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without relating its norms, consistent with the practice of the organs of the OAS, to the corresponding provisions of the Declaration.”)

[78] See also Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Social Rights in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Research Handbook on International Law and Social Rights 173, 180 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2020); Felix E. Torres, The State, the assailant? Guaranteeing economic and social rights after widespread violence through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts 12, 30-33 (2022).

[79] For example, in Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, the Court considered the situation of a Talía, a girl who contracted HIV from untested blood at a clinic, which resulted in significant discrimination at her school, including being barred from attending classes. Her family also endured repeated evictions once landlords learned of her condition. The Court concluded that she suffered from intersecting forms of discrimination because of her status as a woman, a person living with HIV, a person with disabilities, and a minor coming from a lower socioeconomic status Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, (ser. C), No. 298, ¶¶ 285-288 (Sept. 1, 2015). In the Case of the Workers of the Fireworks Factory in Santo Antônio de Jesus and Their Families v. Brazil, the Court considered intersectional discrimination in the context of the structural poverty of victims and pointed to gender, age, race, and pregnancy as factors that could particularly contribute to it. Workers of the Fireworks Factory in Santo Antônio de Jesus and Their Families v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 407, ¶¶ 190-91 (July 15, 2020). For an overview of cases in which the Court referred to intersectional discrimination, see Oscar Parra Vera & F. Antonio Franco Franco, The Intersectional Approach in Inter-American Case Law, in Building Bridges. Contemporary perspectives on gender, sexuality and international human rights law 157 (Alma Beltrán & Puga Rosa Celorio eds., 2024).

[80] See Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 149, ¶ 138 (July 4, 2006).

[81] Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 395, ¶¶ 45–46 (Aug. 23, 2018). The Court also emphasized the state’s role as a guarantor of socioeconomic rights in relation to vulnerable groups in Xákmok Kásek where it singled out the Indigenous community as a vulnerable group. See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement Inter- Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.214, (Aug. 24, 2010).

[82] Some attempts to do so, however, can be observed. See Katie Morris, Vulnerability, Care Ethics and the Protection of Socioeconomic Rights via Article 3 ECHR, 23 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (2023).

[83] European Social Charter arts. 13, 17, 23, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.

[84] Id., art. 27.

[85] See, e.g., European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 46/2007) (inadequate health care services for Roma community), Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 41/2007) (inadequate health care for individuals with mental disabilities), Autism-Europe v. France (Complaint No. 13/2002) (inadequate services for people with autism).

[86] European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, The Rights of Live-in Care Workers, SOC/535 (2021).

[87] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, art. 20, 21, 23.

[88] Id., art. 33.

[89] Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, Case C-149/10, 2010 E.C.R. I-8489, par. 52.

[90] Bauer v. Universität Hamburg & Willmeroth v. Broßonn, Joined Cases C-569/16 & C-570/16, 2018 E.C.R. I-870. See also Lorenzo Cecchetti, Unravelling Horizontal Direct Effect in EU Law: The Case of the Fundamental Right to Paid Annual Leave Between ‘Myth’ and ‘Practice,’ 42 Y. B. Europ. L. 42 (2023). Top of FormBottom of Form

[91] Types of Legislation, European Union, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/law/types-legi… [https://perma.cc/97NF-VTML].

[92] Council Directive 2006/54, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23 (EC) [hereinafter Equal Treatment Directive].

[93] Council Directive 92/85, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Pregnancy Directive].

[94] Directive 2019/1158, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019, 2019, O.J. (L 188) 79 (EU) [hereinafter Work-Life Balance Directive]. 

[95] Council Directive 2010/18, 2010 O.J. (L 68) 13 (EU). This Directive replaced to previous Directive on Parental Leave from 1996. Council Directive 96/34, 1996 O.J. (L 145) 4 (EC).

[96] Equal Treatment Directive, art. 14.

[97] Pregnancy Directive, art. 8.

[98] See Mark Bell & Lisa Waddington, Similar, Yet Different: The Work-Life Balance Directive and The Expanding Frontiers of Eu Non-Discrimination Law, 58 Common Market L. Rev. 1401 (2024).

[99] See Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella, Is There a Fundamental Right to Reconcile Work and Family Life in the EU? in Families, Care-giving and Paid Work 52 (Nicole Busby & Grace James eds., 2011). The “reconciliation principle” refers to the objective of balancing work, family, and private life, primarily through legislation that supports workers with family responsibilities. It aims to increase labor market participation for both men and women and includes measures like paid maternity and parental leave, protection against dismissal for family-related reasons, and flexible working arrangements. 

[100] See e.g. IK & CM v. KfH Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V., Joined Cases C-184/22 and C-185/22 (July 29, 2024). See also JP Jenkins v Kingsgate, Case 96/80 [1981] ECR 911.

[101] Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, Case 170/84, ¶ 8 (May 13, 1986).

[102] S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law, Case C-303/06, 2008, ¶ 42,45, 64 E.C.R. I-5603 (ECJ). Although the Court determined that special workplace accommodations under the Directive are specifically intended for individuals with disabilities, it nevertheless held that the Directive’s prohibition of direct discrimination is not confined solely to those who are disabled. The Court concluded that the principle of equal treatment may also apply when an employee alleges less favorable treatment due to the disability of a child for whom she is the primary caregiver. Such a situation might be called “associative discrimination,” the legal term that applies when someone is treated unfairly because either someone they know or someone they are associated with has a certain protected characteristic. See Univ. of Cambridge, Associative Discrimination,  https://www.equality.admin.cam.ac.uk/training/equalities-law/key-princi… [https://perma.cc/Q33Z-R332].  The European Court of Human Rights came to a similar conclusion in Guberina v. Croatia – the case in which the applicant lived with and provided care for his severely disabled child. See Guberina v. Croatia, no. 23682/13, 22 March 2016. The Inter-American Court also seems to echo this in Furlan and Family when the Court concluded that the problems the boy faced in trying to obtain adequate rehabilitation amounted to a breach of Article 5(1) of the Inter-American Convention (right to the physical, mental, and moral integrity of a person) to the detriment not only of a child but also his family. Furlan and Family v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246 ¶ 265 (Aug. 31, 2012).

[103] Chatzi, Case C-149/10.

[104] European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2022 on a Common European Action on Care, 2021/2253(INI), 2022 O.J. (C). 

[105] See European Commission, Press Release, A European Care Strategy for Caregivers and Care Receivers (Sept. 7, 2022), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5169.

[106] See the full list: Constitute Project, Constitutions, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitutions?lang=en&status=in_force… [https://perma.cc/93CW-JDHF].

[107] See, e.g., Constitution of Armenia (2015), art. 36(3); Azerbaijan (2016), art. 34(4) and 34(5); Belarus (2004), art. 32; Cambodia (2008), art. 47; Eritrea (1997), art. 22(3); Hungary (2016), art. 16; Kazakhstan (2016), art. 27; Lithuania (2011), art. 38; Montenegro (2003), art. 72; Russian Federation (2014), art. 38; Somalia (2012), art. 28; Turkmenistan (2016), art. 40; Uzbekistan (2011), art. 64 and 66; Vietnam (2013), art. 37.

[108] See, e.g., Constitution of Armenia (2015), art. 37(4); Azerbaijan (2016), art. 17(3); Czech Republic (2013), art. 32(4), Constitution of Gabon (2011) art. 1(16), Constitution of German Federal Republic (2014), art. 6(2), Constitution of Honduras (2013), art. 121, Constitution of Indonesia (2002), art. 34; Kyrgyzstan (2016), art. 36(4); North Macedonia (2011), art. 40; Poland (1997), art. 72(2); Slovenia (2016), art. 56.

[109] Constitutions of: Bahrain (2017), art. 5(c), Brazil (2017), art. 227(1), Capo Verde (1992), art. 72, Croatia (2013), art. 57; Cuba (2019), art. 70; Ecuador (2021), art. 47; Estonia, art. 28, Finland (2011), sec. 19; Greece (2008), art. 21, Guatemala (1993), art. 53; Guyana (2016), art. 24; Ireland (2019), art. 45(4); Jordan (2016), art. 6(5); Kenya (2010), art. 54(57), Kuwait (1992), art. 11, Latvia (2016), art. 110, Liechtenstein (2011), art. 25; Moldova (2016), art. 16(5); Nepal (2016), art. 51(j); Panama (2004), art. 113; Peru (2021), art. 7; Romania (2003), art. 49; Sierra Leone (2013), art. 8(3)(f); Slovakia (2017), art. 41; South Sudan (2013), art. 30. Spain (2011), sec. 47, Switzerland (2014), art. 112(c); Ukraine (2019), art. 46; United Arab Emirates (2009), art. 16.

[110] Constitution of New Zealand, art. 21(1).

[111] Id, art. 75.

[112] The CESCR specifies that positive special measures are legitimate to the extent that they represent reasonable, objective, and proportional means to redress de facto discrimination. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2(2), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, ¶ 9 (July 2, 2009). See also Elvira Dominguez Redondo, United Nations Approach to Temporary Special Measures, in The existence and efficacy of affirmative action measures in UK, South Africa, India, China, Latin America and Brazil 239 (Elvira Dominguez-Redondo & Narciso Leandro Xavier Baez eds., 2018). 

[113] On the limits of an “association” as a connection to persons with disabilities see, for example, Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dept. of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that, for example, advocacy on behalf of the affected individuals does not suffice to claims “associat[ed]” to them).

[114] Cuba, Kenya, and South Sudan are among these countries.

[115] For the discussion of human goods, see John Finnis, Natural law and Natural Rights 85-90 (2d ed. 2011).

[116] See Sandra Fredman, Comparative Human Rights Law 60-62 (2018);Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide, in Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa. Symbols or Substance 63 (Malcolm Langford et al., eds. 2013).

[117] Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38, 44 (2003).

[118] See Nicole Busby, A Right to Care? Unpaid Care Work in European Union Employment Law 7 (2011).

[119] See Maia Green & Victoria Lawson, Recentering Care: Interrogating the Commodification of Care, 12 Soc. & Cultural Geography 639, 646-647 (2011). 

[120] See Deborah Stone, For Love, Not Money, in Rethinking Commodification. Cases and Readings in Law and Culture 271 (Martha M. Ertman and Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). 

[121] Eva Feder Kittay, When Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation, 13 Public Culture 557, 560 (2001). CJEU also often points to protecting the special relationship between the mother and her child, which might require taking positive measures by the state. See e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Alfred Stoeckel, Case C‑345/89, 1991 E.C.R. I‑4047, ¶ 13 (CJEU, July 25, 1991); Gabriele Habermann‑Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./Opf. e.V., Case C‑421/92, [1994] E.C.R. I‑1657, ¶ 21 (CJEU, May 5, 1994); Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., Case C‑32/93, [1994] E.C.R. I‑03567, ¶ 20 (CJEU, July 14, 1994); Mary Brown v. Rentokil Ltd., Case C‑394/96, [1998] E.C.R. I‑04185, ¶ 17 (CJEU, June 30, 1998); Margaret Boyle and Others v. Equal Opportunities Commission, Case C‑411/96, [1998] E.C.R. I‑6401, ¶¶ 40, 61 (CJEU, October 27, 1998).

[122] See Daniel Engster, Rethinking Care Theory: The Practice of Caring and the Obligation to Care, 3 Hypatia 50, 51 (2020). 

[123] See Kirstein Rummery & Michael Fine, Care: A Critical Review of Theory, Policy and Practice, 46 Soc. Policy & Adm. 321, 323-324 (2012). 

[124] See, e.g. Rebecca Johnson, Kevin Browne & Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis, Young Children in Institutional Care at Risk of Harm, 7 Trauma, Violence, Abuse 34 (2006); Carlos Ríos-Espinosa, “They Stay Until They Die”: A Lifetime of Isolation and Neglect in Institutions for People with Disabilities in Brazil, Hum. Rts. Watch, (May 23, 2018).

[125] See, e.g., Ivana Radacic, Human Rights of Women and the Public/Private Divide in International Human Rights Law, 3 Croatian Y.B. Eur. L. & Pol. 443, 451-453 (2007); Doris Elisabeth Buss, Going Global: Feminist Theory, International Law, and the Public/Private Divide, in Challenging the Public/Private Divide 360, 362 (Susan Boyd eds., 1997). For the feminist critique of the public-private dichotomy and separating ethics of justice from ethics of care, seeGrace Clement, Care, Autonomy and Justice 67-86 (1996).

[126] Martha Albertson Finemann, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 J. Gender & Soc. Pol’y L. 13, 20 (2000).

[127] See Rodrigo Garcia Schwarz, Social Rights in International Law — Premises for a (New) Fundamental Approach, 46 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 149, 149 (2016).

[128] Valeria Esquivel, Care in Households and Communities: Background Paper on Conceptual Issues, OXFAM Research Reps. 10 (Oct. 2013).

[129] See Louis Henkin, The age of rights (1990).

[130] See e.g., Stephen Tully, A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects, 14 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 175 (2014).

[131] See e.g., Sven Messing et al., Physical Activity as a Human Right? 23 Health & Hum. Rts. J. 201 (2021).

[132] See e.g., James W. Nickel, Making sense of human rights: philosophical reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 96 (1987).

[133] Hurst Hannum, Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century, 16 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 409, 413 (2016).

[134] See Alejandro Rodiles, The Law and Politics of the Pro Persona Principle in Latin America, in The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence 153 (Helmut Philipp Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016).

[135] Thomas M. Antkowiak, A “Dignified Life” and the Resurgence of Social Rights, 18 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1 (2020). See also Elizabeth Wicks, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties, 12 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 199 (2012).

[136] See, e.g., Albán Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 171 ¶ 117, (Nov. 22, 2007); Manuela et al. v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 441, ¶ 183 (Nov. 2, 2021). See also Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 214, ¶¶ 232-234 (Aug. 24, 2010).

[137] Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 166 (1986).

[138] Philip Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 607, 615 (1984) (emphasis added).

[139] Henkin,supra note 129, at 3.

[140] See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, The Primacy of Justice, 9 Legal Theory 269 (2003); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 6 (2010).

[141] See e.g., Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 443, 445 (2010); Leonard Hoffman, The Universality of Human Rights, 125 Law Q. Rev. 416, 428-429 (2009).

[142] Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adequate” as “sufficient; proportionate; equally efficient, and Merriam-Webster offers a similar definition: “sufficient for a specific need or requirement.” See The Law Dictionary, ADEQUATE Definition & Legal Meaning; Merriam Webster, Adequate (Adjective). A good example of such reasoning is the right to adequate clothing safeguarded in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, where there is no one-size-fits-all approach as clothing needs to be adequate to climate, weather, cultural and religious norms, etc. See Luke D. Graham, Reasserting the Right to Adequate Clothing in International Human Rights Law, 24 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2024).

[143] See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). See also Inga T. Winkler, The Human Right to Water, in Research Handbook on International Water Law 242 (Stephen C. McCaffrey, Christina Leb & Riley T. Denoon, eds. 2019).

[144] See Andreas von Arnauld & Jens T. Theilen, Rhetoric of Rights, in The Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights. Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric 34, 39-48 (Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken & Mart Susi, eds. 2020). 

[145] See e.g. Joshua Jeong et al., Parenting Interventions to Promote Early Child Development in the First Three Years of Life: A Global Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 18 PLOS Medicine (2021). 

[146] See e.g. Maya Sabatello, A Short History of the International Disability Rights Movement, in Human Rights and Disability Advocacy 13 (Maya Sabatello & Marianne Schulze eds., 2014).

[147] See Gemma Mitchell, A Right to Care: Putting Care Ethics at the Heart of UK Reconciliation Legislation, 49 Indus. L.J. 199, 228-229 (June 2020). 

[148] Thomas Pogge, World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms 70 (2^nd ed., 2008).

[149] Id. 

[150] See Henkin, supra note 129. 

[151] See, by analogy to the right to water, e.g. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 Ecology L.Q. 957, 972 (2004).

[152] For example, the suggestions from the Request for the Advisory opinions about the right to care as encompassing self-care or environmental care would definitely need greater precision and perhaps discussing it under other categories of rights. 

[153] See ICESCR, supra note 55, art. 2(1).

[154] See ACHR, supra note 73, art. 26.

[155] Charter of the Organization of American States art. 1(h), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.

[156] Id., art. 34.

[157] Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, ¶ 10 (Dec. 14, 1990).

[158] For example, CESCR criticized states for significantly increasing their military expenditure while reducing health and education spending. CESCR, Concluding Observations regarding Algeria, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.71, ¶ 23 (Nov. 30, 2001). See also CESCR, Concluding Observations regarding the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63, ¶ 10 (Sept. 24, 2001).

[159] Gauthier de Beco, Human Rights Indicators for Assessing State Compliance with International Human Rights, 77 Nordic J. Int’l L. 23, 29-30 (2008).

[160] See e.g. ECSR, European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012, (Sept. 11, 2013), (The European Economic and Social Committee concluded that reducing budget allocations for social policies is going to place persons with disabilities at a particular disadvantage). See also Isabel Elbal Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS), CJEU, C-385/11, (Nov. 22, 2012); Johann Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH, CJEU, C-152/11, (Dec. 6, 2012). D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], ECtHR, No. 57325/00, (Nov. 13, 2007).

[161] OXFAM at LAC, Observations in Relation to the Advisory Opinion on “The Content and Scope of the Right to Care and Its Relationship to Other Rights” (Nov. 7, 2023), at 10.

[162] For an overview of the obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation, see Takhmina Karimova, The Nature and Meaning of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges 163 (Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca & Christophe Golay eds., 2014).

[163] For further discussion, see Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the “Maximum Available Resources” to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 693 (Nov. 1994).

[164] See e.g., Katharine G. Young, Proportionality, Reasonableness, and Economic and Social Rights, in Proportionality. New Frontiers, New Challenges 221 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2017). For alternative proposals, see Francisco J. Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing (2017).

[165] Amrei Müller, Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 557, 573 (2009).

[166] Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona & Kate Donald, What Does Care Have to Do with Human Rights? Analyzing the Impact on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, 22 Gender & Development 441, 451 (2014).

[167] Id., at 452.

[168] Deepta Chopra & Meenakshi Krishnan, ‘Care is Not a Burden’: a 7-4-7 Framework of Action for Operationalizing the Triple R, 30 Gender & Development 35, 42 (2022).

[169] Letter Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (May 16, 2012), https://cesr.uwazi.io/api/files/1536788746854aonezhkhiwd.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYD8-N4Z8]. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 3, par. 12; General Comment No. 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, U.N. Doc. E/1996/22 (Dec. 8, 1995), par. 17.