Farshad Ghodoosi*
Introduction﮽
Across Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the esteem of international law seems to be cracking. Its “toothlessness”—and its dependence on great power politics—is in the spotlight once again, pushing scholars to rethink the foundations of the international order. Despite attempted censorship (e.g., see reports related to Gaza here, here and Ukraine here), few can remain unmoved by the images circulating of starving children, maimed bodies, demolished buildings, and civilians crushed beneath rubble. But, especially for those who follow international politics, such images are not new. What is new is the unprecedented degree to which these images are increasingly readily and widely available via social media and the growing sense that the West is behaving hypocritically across various wars and conflicts.
This Essay offers a new perspective on international law and why it matters by arguing that it functions as a component of the normative layer of the international order—one that can become a tool of legitimizing coercion during states of exception.[1] In this Essay, the term “state of exception” refers to moments when normal legal and political constraints are suspended under the claim of existential threat, allowing the exercise of brute force under the guise of legality. The Essay argues that international law can serve as an instrument of the very factor it is designed to restrain: “brute force,” or the direct or threatened use of military and coercive power, including violence, deterrence, and strategic intimidation, to compel behavior irrespective of consent. International law thus makes up the “normative” layer of the international order, while brute force forms the bedrock of the “coercive” layer. International law is thus not irrelevant; rather, it often works in tandem with brute force as two different layers of a single international order.
The Essay invites readers to examine the symbiotic relationship between these layers of the international system. Drawing on the concepts of securitization and narrative construction, this Essay argues that securitization creates a cyclical process: threat narratives justify the use of brute force, and brute force in turn entrenches those narratives by reshaping international law into an instrument of legitimation. In this way, what appears to be a system of legal restraint often operates as a feedback loop that sustains coercion.
The Essay proceeds as follows. First, it identifies the three structural layers of the international order: (1) the coercive, (2) the normative, and (3) the economic. Next, it offers a novel interpretation of international law grounded in narrative (behavioral) and speech-act theories, enabling a deeper understanding of the multilayered nature of international order. Specifically, the Essay argues that the coercive layer—the realm of military and strategic force—forms the foundation upon which the normative and economic layers rest. Rather than restraining coercion, the normative and economic layers can and often do legitimize it, reinforcing power through law, norms, and material structures. Finally, the Essay concludes with reflections on the implications of this framework for understanding how law, power, and legitimacy co-produce the international order. Finally, the Essay concludes with reflections on the implications of this framework.
A Multi-Layered International Order
- The Coercive Layer
Two primary disciplines are devoted to studying the international order: international law and international relations. In its pure form, international law is an agent-centered discipline, grounded in the belief that legal actors—states, courts, and institutions—can shape international norms and behavior. For instance, the concept of the territorial sea was established by a unilateral proclamation from the United States, illustrating the role of agency in norm creation (Oxman, p. 832). International relations, particularly in its traditional realist form, however, adopts a structure-based view of the international system. Here, structure—defined by power politics, material capabilities, and geography—constrains state behavior. In this view, states are ultimately seen as prisoners of their geopolitical circumstances and relative power (Waltz, p. 139; Mearsheimer). Thus, while the normative ideal of international law holds that power can be constrained by legal norms to varying degrees, traditional international relations theory asserts that power dynamics ultimately determine outcomes in international politics. Put simply, international law views international politics as largely agential, whereas international relations conceptualizes it as primarily structural.
The coercive layer, as used here, refers to the material dimension of international politics—particularly the role of military force, threats, and the logic of strategic competition that is the byproduct of an anarchic ‘order’ of the international system. Anarchy is a central concept in the realist view of the international system, in which self-help becomes the guiding principle of state behavior (Waltz, p. 105-107). It encompasses concepts such as the threat of force, deterrence, security dilemmas, and the balance of power (or threat thereof). This layer is central to the realist tradition in international relations, especially by structural realists, offensive realists, and scholars in strategic studies who emphasize the rational use of force and coercion in diplomacy and war.
- The Normative Layer
Over the past few decades, especially following the collapse of the bipolar system, scholars—primarily of international relations—have sought to bridge the gap between materialist and ideational approaches by introducing norms as a key factor influencing state behavior (Peez). This shift represented a move away from the mechanical and materialist assumptions of conventional international relations theories such as realism. In response, theoretical frameworks like constructivism and the English School emerged.
Constructivism argues that international politics is socially constructed and that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt). Rather than treating state interests and identities as given, constructivists emphasize the role of social interaction, shared understandings, and norms in shaping international outcomes. Similarly, the English School views international politics through the lens of a “world society” bound together by common rules, norms, and institutions (Buzan). These norms define what is considered “appropriate” behavior among states. International norms function as “standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink). Violating such norms—much like violating societal norms—can lead to reputational damage, diplomatic isolation, or other forms of “transaction costs,” which may serve to deter noncompliance. In general, this constructivist and English School approach to international relations highlights the power of social structures and normative expectations in shaping state conduct.
The introduction of the concept of a “world society,” as opposed to a purely anarchic system of self-interested states, paved the way for incorporating norms into our understanding of the international system. Even though norm theories range widely—from models of norm socialization and life cycles (e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink) to discursive and speech-act approaches that emphasize how language and interaction constitute norms (as seen in the work of Kratochwil and Onuf)—they all share a common insight: norms are not merely background conditions but constitutive forces that shape identities, expectations, and behavior in the international system.
This normative and social constructivist view of state behavior has informed leading theories of international law in the United States, such as the theory of transnational legal process, which emphasizes the dynamic interaction between international and domestic legal systems through interpretation and internalization (Koh). Before this, the New Haven School of International Law centered international law on the pursuit of human dignity and shared community values through a policy-oriented jurisprudence (Reisman et al., p. 580). Put differently, these foundational approaches to international law were epistemologically anchored in normative values presumed to be inherent to human society. Later theories, influenced by constructivist insights, increasingly turned attention toward norm creation, international institutions, and regime dynamics, focusing on how these structures shape and constrain state behavior. Most notably, the concept of international regimes—developed in the 1980s and 1990s within the neoliberal institutionalist tradition—advanced the idea that regimes consist of sets of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge within a given issue-area (Krasner; Bradford). This shift reflects a broader movement in both international law and international relations—from an agential, values-driven perspective toward a more systemic and socially constructed understanding of legal norms and compliance (Peez).
- The Economic Layer
In addition to the material (hard power) aspects of international order and the ideational dimensions of norms (soft power), political economy is another critical structural layer of the international order. Economic structures and legal frameworks—particularly those governing trade, investment, and finance—profoundly shape state behavior. Under this view, states use their power to shape the international economic system, which in turn can bolster the balance of power in their favor (Gilpin). In contrast to constructivist views, which attribute norm creation to social interactions among states, the political economy perspective sees norms as products of economic power dynamics. From this vantage point, international norms—especially economic rules—are not neutral or universally beneficial; rather, they are often designed to entrench the interests of powerful states, particularly those with dominant positions in the global economy (Rogoff).
A compelling example of this logic is the central role of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency, a position the United States defends not only through institutional and legal regimes but also via broader geopolitical influence. This monetary dominance allows the U.S. to issue large volumes of debt with relatively few economic consequences, exert financial leverage over other states, and shape international institutions in ways that serve its long-term interests (Rogoff). This example underscores a key insight of international political economy: that international law and norms—especially in the economic domain—are often structured not by cooperation alone, but by the enduring asymmetries of economic power.
Narrative International Law[2]
- Norms as Limiting and Legitimizing Coercion
Understanding the three layers—material (coercive), normative, and economic—is essential to analyzing international relations. The international system operates through these three interrelated yet distinct structures: the coercive-military, the normative-social, and the economic-developmental (Mesbahi, 2011). Each layer shapes state behavior in distinct yet mutually reinforcing ways, as none operates in isolation. As for norms, there are clear instances where international norms played a decisive role in international politics and altered the course of state action. For example, the anti-apartheid norm contributed significantly to South Africa’s diplomatic and economic isolation, which in turn pressured the regime toward reform (U.N. Doc. ST/DPI/1658 (1994)). The International Campaign to Ban Landmines also succeeded in creating a powerful humanitarian norm, leading to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty—even influencing non-signatories like the United States to conform in practice (Anderson, 2000). But there are also counterexamples where norms collapsed in the face of power or strategic interests: the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, despite lacking clear UN authorization, violatedthe norm of non-aggression ; and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea (and its attack on Ukraine in 2022) directly contravenedthe norm of territorial integrity with limited material consequences.
The same applies to brute military force. Take, for instance, the post–Cold War moment: the United States, at the height of its unipolar dominance, had the opportunity to fully dismantle Russia’s regional influence but instead opted—at least initially—for policies that favored its recovery, such as supporting Russia’s integration into global institutions like the G8 and WTO. Economic motivations likewise carry weight, but their influence is neither constant nor supreme. Consider sanctions: though rooted in the logic of interdependence—a cornerstone of liberal theory—sanctions are frequently deployed unilaterally, particularly by the United States, in ways that contradict the liberal vision of mutual economic restraint (Ghodoosi, 2025; Ghodoosi, 2015, Ghodoosi, 2014). The United States’s imposition of secondary sanctions on Iran and Cuba demonstrates how economic tools can become instruments of coercion rather than cooperation. In such cases, economic considerations yield to geopolitical imperatives.
- Securitization: The Convergence of Three Layers
This Essay argues that the material (coercive), normative, and economic layers are not isolated but interdependent. Yet identifying which layer is most operative in any given case is not always straightforward. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, was primarily driven by material and strategic calculations, while the Camp David Accords involved a complex interplayof normative diplomacy and regional power balancing. The role of agents—leaders, institutions, or epistemic communities—can sometimes disrupt structural expectations. Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China which sparked a dramatic diplomatic reversal that realigned Cold War power dynamics and challenged long-held ideological and strategic assumptions within both the United States and China, is illustrative. .
Despite their interdependence, this Essay argues that the coercive layer— manifested most visibly through brute force—forms the foundational layer of the international system. Its inner workings and interdependence with the economic and normative layers, however, are critical to understanding the evolution of international order. While the economic and normative dimensions are layered atop the coercive structure, coercive power rarely operates in isolation; the coercive power typically requires normative alignment and institutional framing for its activation and sustainment. Put simply, the coercive layer needs norms and economic power to translate coercion into legitimate and sustainable forms of influence. This is where securitization theory becomes useful. As theorized by the Copenhagen School, securitization refers to the process through which a political actor frames an issue as an existential threat to a referent object—one so severe that it justifies exceptional measures and the suspension of normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998). The Copenhagen School identifies three conditions for securitization: (1) identification of an existential threat, (2) invocation of emergency action, and (3) breaking free of normal political rules (Taureck, 2006). In this process, language and narrative become tools of power (Onuf, 1989). Even realists acknowledge this, as balance-of-threat theory argues that states react not just to capabilities but to perceptions of threat (Walt, 1992).
This Essay asserts that securitization creates a “state of exception.” The normal rules and legal norms that ordinarily govern the international order no longer apply (Christian Reus-Smit, 1997). This suspension can extend even to international law, including its most peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as the prohibition against genocide or the principle of territorial integrity. At this point, all “normal” politics is suspended.
Why, then, does securitization occur? At its core, securitization is a political act (Emily Crick, 2012). Leaders and institutions frame issues as existential threats because doing so authorizes exceptional measures—acts that would otherwise be constrained by law, norms, or economic interdependence. In this sense, securitization provides a pathway for brute force to become not only permissible but seemingly necessary. The motivations behind securitization often overlap with the three structural layers of the international order. At the coercive layer, securitization portrays rivals as immediate dangers, thereby justifying military build-ups or preemptive strikes. At the normative layer, securitization appeals to values and legitimacy: a state that casts an adversary as a violator of certain norms is better able to rally allies and stigmatize dissent. At the economic layer, securitization rationalizes sanctions, market exclusions, or the use of financial dominance as tools of coercion. These layers rarely operate in isolation; together, they produce a self-reinforcing cycle in which law and policy are recast through the lens of threat.
The author seeks to go further: the state of exception is not an aberration but a constitutive rule of the global order. International law, properly understood, functions within the fissures of inter-state security competition, where legal norms and coercive power coexist and mutually reinforce one another. In the view of the author, states are not purely sovereign legal actors but geopolitical entities that reproduce power through law. International law, therefore, does not merely restrain coercion; it often legitimizes it, serving as both a check on and an instrument of power.
- Case Study of Securitization: The Nuclear Threat
The case of Iran is illustrative. For decades, and particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unipolar moment in the international order, Iran has been securitized as a persistent threat, despite its limited military capabilities compared to its competitors (Defense Intelligence Agency’s report Iran Military Power, 2019; Mesbahi, 2011, Parsi & Menon, 2025,. As Mesbahi puts it, the securitization of Iran has been instrumental in denying Iran the benefit of “rationality” on the nuclear issue. (Mesbahi, 2011, pp. 23-24, see also Homayounvash, 2016, Rethinking US Policy Toward Iran: A Forum, 2020). This threat construction has also become institutionalized. From various groups designed to augment the threat, such as United Against Nuclear Iran, to the recruitment of international agencies, namely the IAEA, the threat construction was years in the making. Even the brief de-securitization efforts by entering into the Iran deal in 2015 (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) subjecting Iran to unprecedented international monitoring and access —and with which Irancomplied until the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement—could not change the securitization trajectory—one that ultimately culminated in military action followed by a snapbackto pre-JCPOA conditions this summer. Put simply, the narrative of “nuclear threat” surrounding Iran illustrates how securitization operates across layers of the international order: it first justified economic sanctions—forms of economic warfare—and ultimately prepared the ground for the coercive layer (Ghodoosi, 2025, Ghodoosi, 2015). The cycle reached a critical juncture in June 2025, when U.S. strikes targeted Iranian nuclear sites. These strikes, while justified by officials as measures of “last resort,” relied heavily on a pre-existing narrative that cast Iran as a permanent exception to the norm against the use of force. International law was not absent here—it was instrumental, invoked to authorize the very measures it was designed to restrain. In turn, the strikes reinforced the security narrative itself, demonstrating how brute force and law can become mutually sustaining. As international law scholars warn, the international norm prohibiting the use of force is under severe strain—and may indeed be collapsing (Hathaway & Shapiro, 2025). I argue that this apparent collapse reveals something deeper: the prohibition was never purely constraining but always contained within it the seeds of permissiveness. From its inception, the Charter’s self-defense framework created interpretive space that states have repeatedly expanded through doctrines of anticipatory and preemptive defense (see e.g., Robinson & Haque, 2011).
This Essay argues that once a narrative structure becomes dominant, it creates a feedback loop in which the use of force—and other tools associated with the state of exception, such as the suspension of legal norms and individual rights—not only becomes acceptable but increasingly appears inevitable. At such junctures, the prevailing security narrative tends to overwhelm competing narratives and normative frameworks, leaving little room for political or legal maneuverability. In this context, violations of international norms are no longer anomalies but become structural necessities. Rather than constraining the use of force, international law often functions as a mechanism of legitimation. In such cases, states like Iran are rendered permanent exceptions to the normative rules governing the non-use of force and treaty-based international governance. The European silence (and even explicit endorsement) on recent strikes against Iran, despite their earlier opposition to the Iraq War, is a case in point (see similar approach for Palestinians, Rabea Eghbariah, 2023).
The point is not just that these layers interact, but that there is a dialectical relationship between these layers. The normative layer is shaped by coercive power and economic structures—often to entrench the power of dominant actors—but it also feeds back into the system, shaping the discourse that legitimizes force. Put differently, brute force creates the narrative, and the narrative ultimately justifies the force. Once a threat like that ascribed to Iran is fully constructed through discourse and institutional practice, actors may feel compelled to act militarily, regardless of actual security necessity (see also securitization of Muslims in post 9/11). This is the paradox of the layered international order: that what appears to be moral or lawful may, in fact, be deeply entangled with coercion.
Conclusion
Reality is evasive; no theory can fully capture or predict it. In contrast, theories often construct their own realities, shaping how actors interpret and respond to the world. Narratives—our stories about reality—play a pivotal role in shaping behavior. This is as true for states as it is for individuals. Among these narratives, the security narrative, or the narrative of threat, is arguably the most dangerous. It often triggers the invocation of a state of exception, where legal norms and ethical constraints are suspended.
Once securitization is in full effect, it does not merely bypass norms—it co-opts and instrumentalizes them, transforming law into a tool of legitimation rather than limitation. This is the point at which we “see the pig without the lipstick”—the raw face of power, unmasked. International law works—until it doesn’t. When it fails, it seems to justify brute force, and the discourse is dominated by security narratives that impede resistance.
The implications of this view of international law are profound. International lawyers, scholars, and practitioners must recognize that framing and speech acts matter, for they can be hijacked by the coercive layer or deployed as instruments of economic warfare. Today, nearly one-third of the world’s population lives under some form of sanctions—a manifestation of narrative international law that legitimizes the outcasting of “bad” actors (see e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, 2011). Under the view advanced in this Essay, the task for international lawyers is to expose how legal narratives slide into coercive legitimation and to re-anchor international law in values such as human dignity that cannot be suspended in a state of exception. International law thus matters, but often in overlooked ways: it legitimizes coercion as much as it constrains it. Only through the right prism—and a renewed affirmation of human dignity—can we hope to live in a world where the rule of law, rather than the logic of force, truly governs.
﮽I am grateful for the comments and input of Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Ali Hakim, Matei Alexianu, Renée Robinson, Joshua Geltzer as well as the editors of the Yale Journal of International Law—in particular Sabah Sial, Jessica Anania, Rick Da, Catherine Vera, Madeline Babin, Emily Ma, and Jason Hug—for their invaluable comments and help throughout the editing process.
[1] This Essay forms part of a broader theoretical project that I have developed and which I call “Security Legal Studies”—an approach that views states not as equal sovereigns bound by a social contract, but as geopolitical units whose constitutive grammar is security. Security Legal Studies advances a multi-layered understanding of international order, viewing norms as existing in constant interaction with other layers most significantly the security layer that structures international relations. This perspective draws inspiration from the scholarship of Dr. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, whose work conceptualizes international order as multi-layered and security-focused shaped by the interplay of identity, norms, and geopolitical context, and Dr. W. Michael Reisman, whose policy-oriented jurisprudence and nuanced legal realism illuminate the dynamic processes through which international law is formed, interpreted, and applied. It also builds on insights from Robert W. Cox, Nicholas Onuf, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, among others, as well as from my own earlier research on economic sanctions (Link, Link), where I examined how normative discourse often couches the brutal realities of coercive economic measures.
[2] The term “narrative international law” is adapted from Robert J. Shiller’s term “narrative economics” where he argues that widely circulating stories can shape economic behavior and outcomes. Robert J. Shiller, Narrative Economics, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 967 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.4.967.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge, David Nazarian College of Business & Economics, Department of Business Law, JSD, LL.M, Yale Law School, LLM in Business Law, U.C. Berkeley School of Law, PhD in International Relations, Florida International University.